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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. PRESTON
Plaintiff and
Appellant
vs.

No. 17597

LORNA A. PRESTON
Defendant and
Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the property settlement
portion of a divorce.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial on this matter was bifurcated.

A decree

of divorce was entered by the Honorable Calvin Gould for the
First Judicial District on March 27, 1980.

All questions of

property settlement were reserved until a trial on the merits.
On December 23, 1980 the property issues were tried
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.

The court awarded

each party the property they held prior to marriage and to
assume the debts on such property.

Defendant - Respondent,
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was awarded all the property acquired during the marriage
which she had inherited from her father's estate.

The

court also granted Respondent a lien in the amount of
seventeen thousand dollars, representing one half interest,
in a cabin constructed during the marriage upon land owned
by Plaintiff - Appellant.

The court attempted to equitably

divide the personal property of the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this Court to affirm the judgment below on the grounds that it was a proper settlement of
the property within the discretion of the trial court and
further that Appellant pay Respondent's attorney's fees required for this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The "Statement of Facts" offered by Appellant in his
brief is merely the standard jeremiad always proffered by
whichever party in a divorce action feels that he or she has
been wronged.

All that it shows is that an intentionally

biased editing of self-serving transcript can make any trial
court's decision seem a horrible injustice.
Respondent will not deluge this Court with recitation
of transcript to rebut or refute each and every argument made
by Appellant.

It sufficies to say that a fair reading of the

totality of the testimony offers, as may be expected, support
for two different viewpoints.
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Some facts are clear however.

Appellant was a

practicing attorney (T. 48) who had been married before
and knew what divorces were all about (T. 52).

Further,

Appellant knew of Respondent's prior marriages, her
children, her status as unemployed (T. 48) the fact that
she was receiving child support from a prior marriage
(T. 49) and the fact that Respondent was keeping certain
assets from her prior marriage for the use and benefit of
her children (T. 74, 75, 76, 79).

Indeed, marriage was

proposed by Appellant on more than one occasion and ref used by Respondent for the very reason of economic hardships

(T. 73).
During the course of the marriage Respondent per-

formed, without explicit compensation, all the wifely
services of a marriage including cooking, cleaning, etc.
(T. 58, 59).

These services were not only performed for

Appellant but also for his children on the occasions when
they visited from their custodial parent (T. 60).

From

funds acquired by Respondent from her prior marriage she
contributed to purchasing her children's clothing and
meeting their school needs (T. 119) even though she had no
income of her own during the marriage.

In fact, she was

requested by Appellant to not go to work (T. 83).
Respondent testified that she expended approximately
five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) of her premarital assets
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on refurbishing the home occupied during the course of the
marriage

(T. 80) and that almost all work done on the Bear

Lake Cabin was done jointly and paid for jointly, a little
at a time (T. 88, 90).
The above facts, though admittedly written with
some bias for Respondent's view, attempt to show the overall
circumstances of the marriage.

The specifics of the court's

finding with regard to each of the appealled portions of the
property settlement will be set out within the body of the
argument.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY
AMONG THE PARTIES DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION
Even though the division of property in a divorce
action is a question of equity this Court has stated ad
infitum, using various formulations, that the findings of
the trial judge are accorded broad discretion and will not
be disturbed unless they constitute a clear abuse of that
discretion.

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218 (Utah

1980); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380(Utah 1980); Jesperson_':'.·
Jesperson, 610 P. 2d 326 (Utah 1980).

Viewed from this

perspective and with a fair reading of the transcript as a
whole it is impossible to say that the court below abused
it's discretion in this case.
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BEAR LAKE CABIN
The essence of Appellant's contention regarding the
Bear Lake Cabin is that Appellant should have been credited
with his alleged contribution of fifty percent of the construction costs from funds he held prior to the marriage.
Appellant apparently wishes to require that the trial court
trace each and every fungible dollar of the parties and to
give, with a wisdom that would make King Solomon envious,
each party their exact returns.
In the light of the totality of the evidence it is
not clearly an abuse of discretion for the court to find,
as it did, that:
During the marriage, acting as a
family, and drawing on their earnings, and daily funds pf all, the
family consturcted a cabin on the
plaintiff's land.
(Conclusions of Law No. 4; R.84.)
The trial court was clearly not required to believe,
in its entirety, self-serving Exhibit No. 7 prepared by and
for Appellant.

There is more than ample evidence in the

transcript to support the findings of the trial court in
reaching its conclusions stated above that the property was
built as a family project using everyone's funds.
2 3-p. 9 0,

(T. 88, l.

1. 17. )
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B

RESPONDENT'S INHERITANCE
Appellant's second argument, that Appellant should
have been awarded a half interest in Respondent's inheritance,
is clearly offered in a tit-for-tat fashion.

Appellant is

merely claiming that since Respondent got part of "his" Bear
Lake Cabin he should be entitled to part of "her" inheritance.
In support of this proposition Appellant cites various cases
from across the country holding that it is not per se impermissable to consider an inheritance when dividing the
property of the marriage.
The first weakness in Appellant's argument is a
conunon logical fallacy reasoning that because sm'lething is not
per se impermissable it is per se mandatory.

None of the case;

cited follow the rule of illogic advocated by Appellant and
neither should this Court.

Indeed, the trial court did not

hold, as a matter of law, that the inheritance of Respondent
was inviolable.

Instead, the trial court, reviewing the

totality of the evidence and situation of the parties left
Respondent with her own inheritance as a part of the equitable
distribution of the property.
As shown in the Statement of the Case, supra, Respondent entered the marriage without employment, without a
reliable source of income, with children and without anything
to fall back on should the marriage end, as it did, in divorce
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Appellant, on the other hand, entered the marriage with a
career, a retirement fund, an interest in a law partnership,
substantial resort property and with his eyes wide open.
Respondent left the marriage with essentially only
her inheritance and the support from her prior marriage left
to her name.

In this light it is clearly not an abuse of

the trial court's discretion to give her inheritance to her.

!/

c
PERSONAL PROPERTY
As Appellant admits, his appeal on the personal
property issue is de minimus.

(Appellant's Brief p. 19.)

Not only is it de minimus, it is absolutely impossible to
tell from Appellant's brief what he specifically alleges as
an error and what he would specifically seek returned to him.
Rather, Appellant's contention seems to rely on an inverted
reading of the "clean hands" doctrine.

That is, since Re-

spondent was found to have violated the restraining order she
should get nothing.
Respondent's position here is the same as it is above.
A fair reading of the transcript in its totality shows that the
trial court not only did not clearly abuse its discretion but
instead rendered a fair and equitable distribution of the
property of the parties.

y

In addition to the above argument Appellant specifically
disavowed any interest in receiving a share of Respondent's
inheritance. (T. 148).
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CONCLUSION
Divorce is almost always an unpleasant event for tie
parties.

Moreover, one party almost always feels that he or

she has been wronged by the decision of the trial court; be it
in alimony, child custody, child support or property division.
That party fre'!uently appeals and buttresses its appeal by ex·
elusively

transcri~:

citing self-serving testimony from the

usually their own testimony or prepared exhibits.
Having faced this problem an incalculable number of
times this Court has wisely granted a broad discretion to the
trial judge in these matters due to his intimate familiarity
with the issues, parties and situations.

This Court's decisior.:

only interfere with the trial court's distribution of the
property if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
Viewed as a totality, Respondent submits that the
decision of the trial court was a fair and equitable distribution of the parties properties in yet another of these un·
pleasant cases.

The fair distribution of the trial court was

not a clear abuse of discretion and thus should be affirmed by
this Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 1981.
//

/•I (
' ( [/c

'

/ .. /I; /c !~
FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY
Attorney for, Respondent
1__ , /
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT has been mailed to Plaintiff's Attorney, Robert

w.

Gutke, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah, 84321 on this 13th day of
July, 1981.
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